The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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The Richard M. Titmuss Memorial Lecture

"Citizenship, War and Welfare"

Prof. Robert Pinker
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Richard M. Titmuss was appointed Professor of social Administration at the London School of Economics in March 1950, a position which he held for the rest of his life until 1973. He was one of the outstanding and original social scientists of his generation and in his research, lectures and personal encounters shaped anew the whole concept of social policy in Britain and abroad. For a period of three decades he exerted immense influence in scholarship, politics and government at home and in many countries throughout the world.

Richard Titmuss was a great friend of Israel. His thought and work very much influenced the study of social policy in Israel, and he left a lasting imprint on the social policies of the country. The lecture series in his memory has been made possible with the kind help of his friends in the United Kingdom and by a generous grant of the National Institute of Israel.

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Citizenship, War and Welfare

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Introduction

It is a great honour to be here in Jerusalem to deliver the Richard Titmuss Memorial Lecture. There are people in the audience today who knew, admired and are indebted to the man whose life and work we commemorate, and I number myself among you - in company with his good friend of many years, Professor Abraham Doron.

I approached the subject of today's lecture with much trepidation. The issues of nationhood, citizenship and welfare are all matters of bitter conflict in Israel today. It would be presumptuous of me, as a guest and visitor, to comment directly on these matters. I have, therefore, chosen to draw my subject material from two faraway countries - the United Kingdom and Ireland - where, from time to time, conflicts of a similar kind have arisen over the centuries. I will not, however, seek to draw parallels between our two countries. In my view, the differences are more important than the similarities and the similarities that can be demonstrated are not of a kind that can be used for explanatory or remedial purposes.

The subject of this memorial lecture is the impact of military conflict on two inter-connected aspects of social change - the growth of national consciousness and the evolution of the civil, political and social rights associated with the status of citizenship.

I have chosen this subject for two reasons. First, most social policy theories about the relationship between citizenship and welfare take the existence of a shared sense of national identity for granted. Secondly, those theorists who have written about the impact of war on the growth of civil, political and social rights have tended to

concentrate on wars between sovereign states. Much less has been written about the significance of civil wars within sovereign states. Conflicts about sovereignty and national identity are the most frequent causes of these internal conflicts.

In the first part of this lecture I will review the contribution of two major social policy theorists - Richard Titmuss and T. H. Marshall - whose writings have a bearing on my subject, with regard to England. In the second part, I will test their theories against the evidence of what happened in the wider context of the British Isles.

1. The Titmuss Perspective

Titmuss's conceptualization of the status of citizenship has to be inferred from his normative model of social welfare. Titmuss redefined the values, ends and means of Britain's post-war Beveridgian welfare state in uncompromisingly unitarist terms. With regard to welfare values he opposed the growth of what we call a pluralist mixed economy of welfare on the grounds that such mixed economies were inegalitarian and socially divisive. He was especially critical of the growth of the private and occupational welfare sectors. With regard to welfare ends he defined the statutory social services in terms of one over-riding objective - the fostering of social solidarity based on a framework of reciprocal and egalitarian welfare obligations. (Titmuss, 1976, pp.20-33)

As for the means of social policy, Titmuss was in no doubt that only a statutory "infrastructure of universalist services" could provide the necessary "framework of values and opportunity bases within and around which can be developed socially acceptable selective services aiming to discriminate positively, with the minimum risk of stigma, in favour of those whose needs are greatest." (Titmuss, 1976, p.135) Titmuss identified the statutory social services with altruistic values and private sector services with egoism and self-interest. He argued that only the state has the authority to implement the redistributive policies that he considered essential for the creation of a just society.

In Problems of Social Policy and in one of his famous Essays on the Welfare State, Titmuss advanced the thesis that the shared experiences of the Second World War gave added momentum to a groundswell of social altruism that was already becoming a dominant feature of British society. The threat to national survival posed by powerful external enemies fostered not only a sense of common purpose with regard to winning the war but a commitment to creating a more socially just society after the war was won. (Titmuss, 1950 and Titmuss, 1958, pp.75-87) As Baldwin observes, awareness of "common vulnerability fosters solidarity. A sense of community is encouraged, most simply, in the face of universally shared risk." (Baldwin, 1990, p.34) Baldwin defines social solidarity in essentially Titmussian terms as "justice defined in terms of need. Regardless of birth, merit or work, the citizen in need has a claim to the community's aid." (Baldwin, 1990, p.31) However, it requires a very special set of political circumstances before such lofty sentiments secure a purchase on the public imagination. War may be one such special circumstance but if this is the case it leaves open the question as to how the subsequent momentum towards social reform is to be sustained under conditions of peace.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Titmuss, himself, become increasingly concerned about what he believed to be a growing threat to the post-war welfare consensus from libertarian critics on the right wing of the British political spectrum. In The Road to Serfdom Hayek typically argued that the close association between war and the growth of statutory social services could be readily explained by the fact that both phenomena were essentially undemocratic in character. (Hayek, 1979) The sheer strength of Titmuss's conviction that altruistic social policies fostered social solidarity caused him to underestimate the extent to which redistributive social policies also generate resentment and political conflict.

Titmuss mistakenly confused a shared sense of national identity with a shared sense of social solidarity regarding welfare ends and means. Britain already possessed a shared sense of national solidarity

in 1939. If this had not been the case it might never have survived the Second World War. Although British society was, at the time, beset by many kinds of internal conflict and division, their causes were correctly seen largely in terms of class inequalities. Their remedies were perceived in terms of post-war social reform and social reconstruction.

Nevertheless, the belief that a temporary national consensus about war aims could ever be converted into a more or less permanent consensus about post-war social welfare objectives seems, in retrospect, to be an extreme case of wishful thinking. Wars may be fought to defend democracy but the conduct of war is seldom, if ever, democratic. Democracies are pluralist societies and political pluralism encompasses, amongst other things, a great diversity of conflicting opinions about the ends and means of social policy.

It is not surprising that, in recent years, the Titmuss thesis has been challenged by various scholars on a number of substantial grounds. Harris, for example, argues that Titmuss exaggerated the extent to which British public opinion was characterized by a consensus on social reform objectives throughout the wartime years. Even at the level of policy planning she finds little evidence of agreement or "coherent" thinking about the post-war construction of a welfare state. (Harris, 1986, p.238)

Nevertheless, I think it can be argued that some sort of *ad hoc* welfare consensus did emerge in post-war Britain even though it lacked a "coherent rationale". The consensus attached itself fortuitously to the proposals of the Beveridge Report and it survived, albeit precariously, until the late 1970s. Until then, the Conservatives, when in office, made no substantial changes to the basic institutional structure of the British post-war welfare state. Beneath the surface of this apparent consensus, however, acrimonious disagreements about the ends and means of social policy frequently broke out within the two main political parties.

Titmuss's thesis about the impact of war on the evolution of citizenship and the making of social policy is deficient in three respects. First, it was exclusively concerned with wars between sovereign nation states. Secondly, Titmuss was able to take the concept of a shared national identity for granted because, at the time that identity was a political fact of British society based, as it was, on an eighteenth century Act of Union. Thirdly, he wrongly associated this objective state of shared national identity with other, more subjective, notions of social solidarity which went beyond the immediate pursuit of war aims to include longer term social policy objectives.

In retrospect, it is difficult to understand why Titmuss came to attach such salient and causal significance to social welfare as the institutional lynch-pin of citizenship and social solidarity and as the key agent of future economic, political and social change. His own normative model of social welfare was unitary in character and radically redistributive in its political objectives. Such objectives were bound to foster conflicts rather than consensus in post-war British society even though the conflicts would stop far short of internal war.

2. The Marshall Perspective

Unlike Titmuss, Marshall developed a theory of citizenship and welfare that was explicitly pluralist in character and sympathetic to the roles of both competitive markets and a mixed economy of welfare. They also differ in other important respects. In developmental terms, Titmuss's normative model of welfare is, to say the least, rather short on historical perspective. His concept of citizenship, almost by default, has to be inferred from his normative model of welfare because he gives so little attention to the long sequence of historical events, antecedent to the Second World War, that contributed to the evolution of citizenship in British society. Titmuss's concept of welfare is narrowly defined in terms of a range of social rights and obligations discharged primarily through the agency of statutory social services. This unitary model of welfare becomes, in turn, the main

component in his model of citizenship. The civil and political components are scarcely mentioned.

In contrast, Marshall defines citizenship as "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed." (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992, p.18) Citizenship, in this broader and more general sense, becomes a basis for social solidarity. The pluralist range of Marshall's approach unfolds as he proceeds to identify three key elements in the status of citizenship. The first of these elements comprises our civil rights and obligations with regard to "personal liberty, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts and the right to justice." (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992, p.8) The second of these elements is "the right to participate in the exercise of power" either as a voter or as a representative. In Britain this range of civil and political rights were all largely secured before the Second World War and the creation of a post-war welfare state.

The third element in Marshall's model of citizenship encompasses our social rights "to a modicum of economic welfare and security ... and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society." (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992, p.8) In his essay on 'Value Problems in Capitalism', Marshall went on to explore the problems of reconciling the claims of democracy and welfare in a free society. (Marshall, 1981) In contrast to Titmuss's unitary conceptualization of both citizenship and welfare, Marshall sets out a pluralist model of "democratic - welfare - capitalism" in which the rights of citizenship inhibit the inegalitarian tendencies of the free economic market while accepting that competitive markets and some degree of economic inequality are functional preconditions for the efficient production of wealth and the protection of all our civil rights.

Although Marshall makes little explicit reference to war in Citizenship and Social Class he does include it in his other major text

on the growth of Social Policy in the Twentieth Century. (Rees, 1985, pp.78-90) There is, however, substance in Michael Mann's view that while the Marshall thesis was "essentially true for Great Britain it was, nevertheless, entirely about Great Britain." (Bulmer and Rees, 1996, p.126) The same can be said of Titmuss's thesis, but what Marshall's approach lacks in comparative perspective is compensated for in the depth of his historical perspective. He goes back in time to locate the origins of civil rights in the eighteenth century. He traces the growth of political rights through the nineteenth century and beyond. He ends by equating the extension of social rights with the growth of the modern welfare state throughout the twentieth century.

Bryan Turner suggests that Marshall took "the existence of a British nation-state for granted" and consequently overlooked the processes by which it came into being. (Turner, 1986, p.46) Marshall, in fact, does address this issue but with reference to England rather than Great Britain when he draws attention to the institutional links between the growth of an English national identity and the major policy reforms that occurred during the sixteenth century.

Elizabethan England, he suggests, "was a planned society, but of a conservative, not a revolutionary kind." Throughout this period new economic and social policies were legislated on a national basis. They were designed to maintain and protect the political status quo "by fixing both the wages of the workers and the relief of the poor, by regulating both the apprenticeship of sons of well-to-do families and the setting of pauper children to work, and by the recognition or creation of liberties and monopolies by which local communities and societies of tradesmen could direct their own affairs and protect the interests of their members." (Marshall, 1981, pp.56-57)

Marshall goes on to assert that sixteenth century Elizabethan England "witnessed the first expression of national patriotism, the first comprehensive national policy, and the first shift of interest from the revenues of princes to the wealth of nations." (Marshall, 1981, p.56) These changes occurred against a background of military conflict,

including a war with Spain, a disastrous invasion of Ireland and a failed Catholic rebellion against the Crown.

Military conflict was the catalyst through which England was transformed into the unitary sovereign-state of Britain. The Civil Wars of 1642-49 were, as Norman Davies describes them, fought over religion and "opposing concepts of political liberty" but they also involved "successful wars of subjugation against Ireland and Scotland. It was not until the conclusion of these wars and the establishment of Cromwell's Protectorate in 1646 that "for the first time in British history, England completely dominated the British Isles." (Davies, 2000) The subsequent passing of the Acts of Union between England and Scotland in 1707 and England and Ireland in 1800 completed this process with the authority of statute law.

It was during this long period of civil wars and military conquest when a common national identity was being imposed on the people of the British Isles by the English that the gradual evolution of British civil, political and social rights began gathering momentum. Turner makes a similar point when he suggests that the development of British citizenship through a process of internal colonization was attended by a loss of political rights and regional autonomy in Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In his view, Marshall fails to explain how this expansion of social rights "within a national core" came to be paralleled by "the withdrawal of significant political rights at the periphery." (Turner, 1986, pp.46-47)

This seeming paradox might best be explained by the fact that both processes of change were fraught with conflict from the start. Wars of annexation and civil wars impose new national identities on victors and vanquished alike. They are less successful in creating the conditions that permit the subsequent evolution of an inclusive and egalitarian model of citizenship. Indeed, wars always leave a legacy of unresolved conflicts and inequalities in their wake.

This was certainly the case with regard to Britain after the 1707 Act of Union which incorporated Scotland into England and the 1800 Act of Union which created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. In England, Scotland and Wales, Catholics and Protestant Dissenters were not granted equal political rights until the late 1820s. Jews were not granted full parliamentary rights until 1860. It was not until the 'Fourth Reform Act' of 1918 that the right to vote was extended to all men over the age of 21 and all women over the age of 30, provided that the women were ratepayers or the wives of ratepayers. The full enfranchisement of women was not achieved until 1928. All these extensions of civil and political rights gave rise, at times, to episodes of civil unrest and open conflict involving the use of armed force even in those parts of the country which, in large part, were content to be members of a new British nation. The conflicts arose, however, among sections of the population who felt they were being unjustly denied complete inclusion as British citizens.

The subjugation of Ireland left a uniquely bitter legacy of internal conflict and sporadic civil war. As the centuries of occupation, repression and mismanagement passed, even the Irish who initially wanted to secure their full rights as British citizens became disaffected and gave their support to what eventually became a popular movement for national independence. A necessarily brief account of how this transformation occurred may cast some light on the ways in which civil wars can fundamentally change the relationship between the growth of national consciousness and the evolution of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship.

3.   The Origins of the Conflict

Irish historians writing from a 'nationalist' perspective have described these events in terms of a protracted and sharply polarized struggle "between an emerging Irish nation and a tyrannical English imperialism." Since the 1940s, a second school of 'revisionist' historians have adopted a 'less judgmental' approach that is "more sensitive to the precise nature of Britain's involvement in Ireland" and

more disposed to attach greater causal significance to the long-standing religious and political divisions within Irish society. (Smith, 2000, pp.1-8) My interest lies in exploring the ways in which the Irish came to be deprived of their basic civil, political and social rights throughout the period in which - according to Marshall - the same component rights of citizenship were being extended throughout the rest of the British Isles.

The first English invasion of Ireland took place in 1171. From the late twelfth to the middle of the fourteenth century successive waves of English settlers colonized the best lands and drove out the Irish. It was not long before the English settlers had established a settlement around Dublin which became the seat of an Irish Parliament, dominated by a combination of Anglo-Norman and Irish landowners (Beckett, 1971, p.23) and subject to the authority of the British Crown. (Smith, 2000, p.2) During the early sixteenth century attempts at reconciliating the Irish by winning over their Gaelic leaders and integrating them with the Anglo-Norman aristocracy ended in failure because the English simultaneously began imposing a Protestant regime on a predominantly Catholic country.

The next stage in the systematic colonization of Ireland began with the establishment of plantations of English colonists from the mid-1550s onwards. As Beckett explains, "in Ireland the main object of the plantation policy was to substitute loyal English settlers for disloyal Irish or Anglo-Irish" owners. (Beckett, 1971, p.55) This policy was pursued with such rigour that the dispossessed Irish eventually rebelled under their Gaelic leaders in 1595. Soon after their defeat in 1598 the Gaelic nobility fled the country. "The Tudor conquest was complete. The social and political system of Gaelic Ireland was gone" and had been replaced by the authority of the Dublin Government and the common law of England. (Beckett, 1971, p.62)

New plantations of Scottish Protestants were settled in Ulster and the northern Gaelic-speaking Irish were evicted at the start of the seventeenth century. The Irish rebelled again in 1641 and the country remained in a state of armed conflict throughout the English Civil Wars. In 1649 Cromwell led a new invasion of Ireland. After a short and bloody conflict the Irish were defeated, most of the remaining Catholic landowners were dispossessed, the rebel leaders were executed or deported and the cultural institutions of Gaelic Ireland were suppressed.

The next Irish insurrection occurred in 1690 when the deposed King James II landed in Ireland with a French army and rallied the Irish Catholics to his cause. His defeat by William III's army marked the eclipse of Irish hope for independence. A new system of penal laws was subsequently imposed on the Irish Catholics. From 1728 onwards they were denied the right to vote, to pursue careers in the army, in central or local government and in the learned professions. They were permitted to practice their religion but their children were not allowed to be educated abroad or to study at a university. The penal laws also placed severe restrictions on the rights of the few remaining Catholic landowning gentry to buy, sell or increase their property holdings. (Beckett, 1971, pp.95-99)

In summary, the Irish Catholic landed gentry had been deprived of their civil and political rights before the extension of these rights began to gather momentum on mainland Britain. The Protestant Ascendancy in Dublin was not greatly concerned about the mass of Irish peasantry. They had no rights to speak of, did not own their own land and consequently had no access to power or influence. The concept of welfare rights is a twentieth century notion. The ownership of land, however, has always been a key determinant of status, wealth and the prospect of welfare. In eighteenth century Ireland it was also correctly viewed by the Protestant Ascendancy as "the key to political power" which explains why they imposed such severe restraints on the property rights of the Catholic gentry. (Beckett, 1971, p.98)

The Protestant Ascendancy, however, did not represent the interests of all Protestants. It defended the interests of the Anglican

Church of Ireland and the established Church of England against all the other non-Anglican Protestant dissenters and, in particular, the Ulster Presbyterians. It used its considerable powers to restrict their access to political office and influence. With the passage of time these restrictions were eased and eventually removed in 1780. By then the Ulster Presbyterians were building political alliances with other non-Anglican Protestants and Catholics in their campaign for constitution reform and a more democratic and independent parliament. New political divisions were already emerging among the subject people of Ireland.

In 1782 the British Government granted the Irish Parliament the right to make its own laws, subject to the continuance of British executive authority. Most of the penal laws against Catholics were removed, although they were still denied the right to vote. Some of the Irish patriotic reformers were content with these concessions. Another, more radical group of Protestants and Catholics - the United Irishmen - wanted more fundamental reforms, including the right to vote for Catholics. Against the threatening background the French Revolution this demand was also conceded in 1793.

At this point the old Protestant Ascendancy decided that the time for compromised was ended. A United Irish agent was arrested on his return from France and charged with plotting another Irish rebellion. The United Irishmen were officially suppressed, went underground and prepared for an armed insurrection. Paradoxically, they were strongly supported in Ulster where they were just as strongly opposed by the increasingly militant Orange Societies who were staunchly loyal to the British Crown.

The rebellion, when it came in 1798, was brutally put down. The British Government, now at war with France, acted swiftly to impose total control on the disaffected province. It had good strategic reasons for doing so since, at the time, "Ireland contained approximately one quarter of the total population of the British Isles." (Beckett, 1971, p.126) In 1800 the Irish and English Parliaments passed two identical statutes which merged Great Britain and Ireland into one United Kingdom. The Irish Parliament was abolished in 1801.

Four centuries of military conflict and sporadic civil war had left the Irish stripped of the last vestiges of national independence. Henceforward they were to be citizens of the United Kingdom and any further extension of their civil, political and social rights would have to be won in the parliament at Westminster to which they could now elect one hundred members.

4.   From Catholic Emancipation to Land Reform

At the start of the nineteenth century, the right to vote and stand for Parliament was confined to a minority of landed property owners. A successful Catholic candidate would still be debarred from taking his seat in Parliament unless he was prepared to set aside his religious convictions and take an oath of supremacy acknowledging the English Crown in all temporal and spiritual matters.

In 1823 Daniel O'Connell formed a Catholic Association dedicated to achieving the goals of religious emancipation and national independence. O'Connell was a landowner, a barrister and an accomplished politician, committed to peaceful constitutional reform. His programme for change combined the causes of national independence, Catholic Emancipation and land reform and won the support of a broad spectrum of Irish society including the Catholic clergy and the impoverished peasantry.

In 1828 O'Connell won a bye-election in County Clare. As a Catholic, he was bound to refuse the Oath of Supremacy which meant that he would be excluded from Parliament. The Irish countryside was in a state of semi-military conflict. The British Government, knowing that it had to choose between conceding emancipation and a civil war, backed down. The passing of the Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829 granted equal political rights to all Catholics throughout the United

Kingdom. Against the odds, backward Ireland had won the extension of an important right of citizenship across the rest of the British Isles.

In 1840 O'Connell established a new National Repeal Association to further the cause of Irish independence through peaceful reform. He was, however, prepared - if necessary - to settle for a limited form of home rule and he also asked his supporters to reject the use of force under any circumstances. The Young Irelanders rejected both proposals and severed their links with O'Connell. (Beckett, 1981, p.334) Ireland, however, was already on the brink of a disaster that would have a devastating impact on its future economic and social wellbeing. By the 1840s, the Irish population had risen to over eight million. Two-thirds of the Irish people were tenants dependent on their agricultural small holdings. Their staple diet was the potato, and in 1845 the potato crop failed in many parts of the country. In the following year the crop failed again and the Great Famine began.

In the 1840s, the Irish Poor Law was the only government agency in the country responsible for the relief of extreme destitution. In 1834 the old English Poor Law had been transformed into a system designed to deter all but the genuinely destitute. The new Poor Law was based on the principles of 'the workhouse test' and 'less eligibility'. Any applicant who was entitled to vote was also disenfranchised as a condition of receiving help. At this time, the franchise was so restricted that very few relief applicants would have been entitled to vote but as the franchise was extended in 1867 and 1884 more and more citizens were disenfranchised. All applicants for relief were given help only if they agreed to enter a workhouse in which living conditions would be less attractive than those experienced by the poorest paid independent labourer outside its walls. In 1838 this system had been imposed on Ireland despite the protests of an Irish Commission which had previously been appointed by the British Government to advise on the issue of poor relief.

The Irish Commission had argued that "there was no point in trying to force people to get work through the application of the workhouse test, when, for the great majority of the Irish people, there was no work to be found." (Burke, 1987, p.29) Destitution was so widespread in Ireland that a workhouse system, modeled on English lines, would have to accommodate well over two million people. No system of locally financed poor relief could meet the costs involved, least of all in Ireland where so many landowners were themselves on the edge of bankruptcy. The British Government rejected the Commission's advice on the grounds that, since the aims of English poor law policy had already been agreed, "it was only logical that Ireland should follow suit and that Irish property should support Irish paupers." (Burke, 1987, p.23)

As the famine intensified, it quickly became obvious that a deterrent poor law could not cope with such a tide of destitution. In order to preserve the integrity of the workhouse test the Government resorted to a diversity of other short term emergency measures. American maize was imported - in insufficient amounts - and sold to the poor at cost price. Soup kitchens were opened by Government and voluntary agencies. As epidemics of relapsing fever, cholera and scurvy swept the country, temporary hospitals were built. Public work schemes were started and employment offered to people who were to weak to work.

Ireland, simply, lacked the administrative structures to cope with such a disaster. In 1847 the Government reluctantly agreed to the provision of poor relief outside the workhouses under stringent conditions of eligibility. Within the year over eight hundred thousand applicants were receiving outdoor relief. By 1849, as the Famine abated, a million people had died of hunger and disease and another million had emigrated. Over the following three years, a further three million left the country.

The memory of this disaster left the great mass of Irish people deeply embittered. Many of them were convinced that the British had

intentionally left the Irish to starve in order to teach them a lesson and bring them to order. O'Connell had died in 1847 leaving his reform movement divided and demoralized. Irish revisionist historians reject these conspiracy theories and attribute the failure of the British Government to its administrative incompetence and its doctrinaire attachment to the principles of political economy and welfare deterrence.

Centuries of intermittent civil war had long reduced the mass of the Irish people to a subsistence standard of living. In addition, as Smith points out, the other major cause "of Ireland's rural impoverishment, her economic backwardness and her agricultural depression lay firmly with the evils of landlordism, which extracted wealth to London, evicted tenants at will and exercised a brutal, harsh regime across the Irish countryside." (Smith, 2000, p.4) It can, however, be argued that the historical origins of this regime lay just as firmly in the policies of land expropriation, eviction and settlement that followed in the wake of military conquest. The Great Famine added the experience of mass emigration to the troubles of Ireland.

As it happened, Ireland's next major nationalist movement began in the USA where a group of immigrants founded the Fenian Brotherhood in 1858. The Fenians were militant revolutionaries determined to win independence by violent means. In 1866 the American Fenians attacked a Canadian border post and, in the following year, the Irish Fenians launched terrorist raids on mainland Britain, including a series of bombings, murders and jail breaks. There were other Irish nationalists who opposed the use of physical force. Isaac Butt established a Home Rule Association in 1870 which became the Home Rule League in 1873. He led the Irish Home Rule group of MPs at Westminster but failed to win wider support for a limited form of self-government. Soon afterwards, he was replaced as leader by Charles Stewart Parnell.

The Fenian 'outrages' elicited a much swifter reaction from the British Parliament. The Prime Minister, William Gladstone, had long been preoccupied with the 'Irish Question'. His first response to the bombings was conciliatory. He persuaded Parliament to pass an Act disestablishing the Church of Ireland and thereby ended the ecclesiastical authority of the old Protestant Ascendancy. Two years later, in 1871, the passage of a Land Act gave greater security of tenure to Irish tenant farmers. In Ulster, tenants had always been protected by custom so long as a fair rent was paid. They were also entitled to compensation for improvement in the event of their eviction. These customs were now incorporated into law and extended in large part to the rest of Ireland. (Beckett, 1981, p.371)

The provision of the Land Act of 1871 did not satisfy the Irish tenantry who wanted nothing less than perpetuity of tenure. Neither were they effective in stopping evictions. In the face of continuing rural unrest and violence a Coercion Act was passed and the ringleaders arrested.

In 1879 Michael Davitt and Charles Stewart Parnell formed an Irish Land League with the intention of using moral force to compel landowners to reduce rents by withholding payment if they refused to do so. More significantly, the League invented the stratagem of 'boycotting' evicting landowners. This stratagem took its name from a Captain Boycott who managed a large estate in the north-west of Ireland. When he evicted some of his tenants he was ostracized by the entire local community and threatened with crop burning. The Government had to send in a thousand troops to protect his land.

Clearly the Land League policies had crossed the line between the use of moral and physical force but, as they were adopted throughout Ireland, they proved effective. In 1880 Gladstone's Liberal Party was returned to office and a year later passed a new Land Act guaranteeing Irish tenants their rights to a fair rent, free sale and fixity of tenure. For people who had traditionally associated their welfare with land this legislation marked, in modern terminology, a significant extension of their social rights. No such rights were granted to their English counterparts.

5.   Irish Home Rule, British Social Reform and World War I

Despite these reforms, the evictions continued. As violence in the countryside escalated, Parnell was arrested and his Land League called a rent strike. Parnell and the British Government reached a compromise. He agreed to use his influence in stopping the violence. The Government agreed to give the tenants more protection, to end coercion and to release Parnell. But Parnell was no longer able to control his extremists. Shortly after his release from prison, the Chief Secretary and Under-Secretary of Ireland were assassinated by a group of terrorists known as 'The Invincibles'. The atrocity was condemned on all sides. A new Coercion Act was passed and the violence went on.

Two new important laws were passed in 1884 and 1885. They extended the franchise throughout the United Kingdom in ways which greatly benefited the Irish parliamentary party. In the General Election of 1885, Parnell won enough seats to hold the balance of power at Westminster. (Beckett, 1981, p.395) Gladstone, became Prime Minister and announced his conversion to Home Rule. He was opposed, not only by the Conservatives, but by some of his own MPs who broke away to form their own Liberal Unionist Party. Some of the Conservatives became directly involved in helping the Ulster Protestants prepare for armed resistance to Home Rule.

Parnell supported Gladstone's Home Rule Bill but the Bill was defeated in the House of Lords, another General Election was called and Gladstone lost. Both the Liberal Party and Ireland were left deeply divided. By 1890, Parnell's political credibility was destroyed when he was cited as the co-respondent in a divorce case. He lost the support of both Gladstone and the Catholic Church in Ireland. His own party, anxious to preserve its alliance with the Liberals, abandoned him. Parnell, with a few loyal followers, denounced both Home Rule and the alliance and opted for complete independence.

Exhausted and disillusioned, he died suddenly in 1891 at the age of forty-five.

The victorious Conservatives were to remain in office from 1886 to 1905, apart from a brief interlude of Liberal government. The Conservatives were implacably opposed to Home Rule. They were also convinced that policies of social reform, and in particular, the ending of landlordism, would persuade the Irish to accept their status as citizens of the United Kingdom. They introduced new legislation which gave financial incentives both to tenants who wanted to buy their land and to landlords who were prepared to sell. These policies were popular and strikingly successful. Their implementation was briefly interrupted in 1892 when Gladstone and the Liberals were returned to office. Undeterred by Ulster Unionist threats of armed insurrection, Gladstone introduced a second Home Rule Bill in 1893. For a second time the Bill was defeated in the House of Lords, the Liberals resigned and the Conservatives won the General Election with a large majority.

When the Liberals were eventually returned to office in 1905, they introduced a major social reform programme to be financed from the revenues of a 'People's' Budget. After the House of Lords rejected this Budget in 1909, the Liberals called a General Election. They promised the Irish parliamentary party that, if they won, they would introduce a new Home Rule Bill. The Liberals were returned to office with a reduced majority, leaving them dependent on the Irish party in their struggle with the Lords. Once more, the House of Lords threw out the Budget and another General Election was called. Once more the Liberals were returned, but they were still dependent on the Irish party. This time they threatened to create enough new Liberal peers to give themselves a majority in the House of Lords. Reluctantly, the Lords conceded defeat and the People's Budget became law.

The Lords were also forced to approve a new Parliament Act. Under the provisions of this Act, the House of Lords lost the power to

veto any legislation initiated by the House of Commons. In the case of bills involving money they could delay the legislation for only one month. They could delay other legislation for two years which meant that they would not be able to veto the eventual passage of a Home Rule Bill as they had done in 1893. The Liberal Government's determination to extend the social or welfare rights of United Kingdom citizens consequently became the means by which the political rights if the Irish to a limited measure of self-government was achieved.

A Home Rule Bill was presented to Parliament in 1912. In the face of this renewed threat, the Ulster Unionists raised an armed militia of 100,000 volunteers prepared to fight either for complete independence or exclusion from the provisions of a Home Rule Bill. The crisis intensified when the officers of a British army unit based outside Dublin threatened to resign if they were ordered to impose Home Rule on the people of Ulster against their wishes. It soon became clear that they had considerable support from their superiors and, although they were assured that they would not be ordered to fight in Ulster, the Minister of War was forced to resign.

The Irish nationalists were also prepared to fight if the Home Rule Bill was defeated. After twice being passed by the Commons and twice rejected by the Lords, the Bill was about to become law in the autumn of 1914 when all these events were overtaken by the outbreak of the First World War. The British Government, deeply concerned about the reliability of some sections of the army in the event of an Irish civil war, suspended the introduction of Home Rule until the ending of hostilities.

The Irish parliamentary party supported the war and its leader, John Redmond, encouraged young Irishmen to enlist in the British Army. Alongside their Ulster contemporaries they did so in large numbers. A small group of militant nationalists - the Irish Republican Brotherhood - prepared for insurrection at home. In 1916 they seized buildings in the centre of Dublin and proclaimed an Irish Republic.

The rising was put down and its leaders were courtmartialled and shot. The brutality of the British reprisals alienated large sections of the Irish public.

In 1917 Sinn Fein and the Brotherhood combined into one party and began winning public support at the expense of the moderate nationalists who were, by now, willing to settle for Home Rule and a partitioned Ireland. The moderates subsequently "went down to a crushing defeat at the hands of Sinn Fein in the December 1918 election, the first conducted under universal male franchise" in the United Kingdom. (O'Leary and McGarry, 1997, p.97) In 1920 Lloyd George's post-war Coalition Government passed the Government of Ireland Act which partitioned Ireland and established separate Home Rule parliaments in the South and the North. The new Protestant province of Ulster was left with a large Catholic minority.

Sinn Fein rejected Home Rule and partition. Its elected MPs refused to take up their seats at Westminster and, in 1919, established their own provincial government in Dublin. Civil war broke out between the British armed forces and the Irish Republican Army. Many atrocities were committed on both sides before a cease-fire was agreed in 1921. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of that year granted an Irish Free State of 26 Southern counties with the status of a Dominion under the British Crown. Ulster remained within the United Kingdom. The militant Irish republicans rejected the Treaty and another civil war began, this time between the Irish Free State Government forces and the IRA 'irregulars'. By 1923 the Government had crushed the rebellion and the peace was to leave Ireland bitterly divided for decades afterwards.

6.   The Inter-War Years and Two Kinds of Post-War Settlement

The scene had been set for another seventy years of sporadic and escalating terrorism. In Northern Ireland, the Unionist Government created its own police force with special internal security duties. (Fraser, 200, p.6) It redrew the electoral boundaries in order to restrict

the civil, political and social rights of its Catholic citizens. Throughout the inter-war years Northern Ireland became a semi-autonomous province within the United Kingdom, but it was a province divided on sharply sectarian lines.

In the Irish Free State, the momentum towards social reform was not sustained although, for a time, agriculture prospered under a free trade policy because almost all of its produce was sold in Britain. (Fraser, 2000, p.10) In 1932 Eamon de Valera, a survivor of the Easter Rebellion and the 1922-1923 civil war, became Prime Minister. In the civil war he had been on the losing side. De Valera was a committed nationalist, dedicated to the creation of "a genuinely independent, self-sufficient republic" based on Christian and Catholic values and the revival of the Gaelic language and culture. He was not greatly interested in social policy issues. His idea of welfare was grounded in the doctrines of economic protectionism and the vision of a frugal, God-fearing nation of self-sufficient farmers. (Brown, 1990, pp.140-145)

In the 1930s the Irish farmers were still paying back the loans they had received from the British Government under the terms of the 1890 - 1903 land purchase Acts. The cost of repaying these annuities accounted for 18 per cent of all Government expenditure. (Fraser, 2000, p.18) De Valera suspended the payments and the British Government immediately imposed a 20 per cent duty on all Irish exports. This dispute, which severely damaged the Irish economy, was not resolved until 1938.

Throughout the 1930s, de Valera worked 'step by step' to weaken Ireland's remaining constitutional links with the United Kingdom. In 1937 the Irish Parliament adopted a new constitution which changed the country's name to Eire, affirmed the 'special position' of the Catholic Church in Ireland and categorically stated that "the national territory consists of the whole of Ireland." (Fraser, 200, p.20) These actions heightened the anxieties and hardened the resolve of the Northern Ireland Unionists.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939 Ireland remained neutral and the IRA launched a number of terrorist attacks in Britain. After the British Labour Party won the 1945 General Election and started to implement Beveridge's proposals for a post-war welfare state, the Northern Ireland Government made sure that its citizens were included in this plan - partly to secure the benefits it offered and partly to consolidate its political union with Britain.

Thus, it came about that the whole population of Northern Ireland secured a substantial extension of their social rights to welfare by virtue of being United Kingdom citizens while its Catholic minority continued being denied the same civil and political rights enjoyed by all other United Kingdom citizens. This anomaly was left uncorrected when the provisions of the Ireland Act of 1949 effectively confirmed the status of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom.

The Irish Government did not launch a major programme of social reform in the late 1940s but some of its leading politicians wanted to follow the UK precedent. In 1950, the Health Minister, Noel Brown, introduced a Bill to provide free health services for pregnant mothers and post-natal care for nursing mothers and babies. The Catholic hierarchy of bishops and their clergy opposed the scheme on the grounds that state intervention of this kind was "contrary to Catholic teaching" on all matters relating to social welfare. It did not want the state to become more involved in any services affecting the institutions of family life, marriage and the upbringing of children. It was particularly concerned to defend its dominant role in education. The Irish Government, in the fact of this opposition, quickly dropped the Bill.

The Catholic Church had checked the growth of social rights in Ireland far more effectively then the House of Lords had been able to frustrate the political aspirations of the Irish nationalists. The subsequent expansion of Irish statutory social services did not take off

until the power and influence of the Church had declined and its own views on the role of government had began to change. Ireland's admission to the EEC in 1973 proved to be an important turning point in this process.

7. From 'Bloody Sunday' to the Good Friday Agreement

Time does not permit a detailed analysis of the most recent trends in the growth of political and civil rights in Northern Ireland and the impact of internal war on these developments. The developments can, however, be outlined in summary form.

First, from the 1960s onwards, Northern Ireland became the arena in which the unresolved historic conflicts about national identity, the partition and possession of land and citizenship rights was carried on with murderous intensity. Over the decades, however, the violence has gone beyond the borders of Northern Ireland to mainland Britain and the Irish Republic. As O'Leary and McGarry point out, "Since 1969 nearly 3,000 people have died because of political violence in Northern Ireland" and thousands more have suffered physical and psychological injuries. (O'Leary and McGarry, 2000, pp.10-12)

Secondly, the post-war challenge to the Unionist ascendancy in Northern Ireland started in the 1960s in the form of a civil rights movement. It began with campaigns against discriminatory practices such as the allocation of public housing funds on sectarian lines designed both to segregate and minimize the voting power of Catholics. Many Unionists suspected, and not without good reasons, that the civil rights movement was also acting as "a thin cover for republicanism" and its paramilitary organizations. (Fraser, 2000, p.39 and p.44)

Thirdly, the tragic events of 'Bloody Sunday' marked the turning point at which violence escalated and the civil rights movement was caught up in a renewed civil war for the ending of partition and the reunification of Ireland. On 30 January 1972, a civil rights march in

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Derry ended with the killing of twelve civilians by the British Army. From that time onwards, the paramilitary nationalist and unionist organizations became increasingly involved in the conflict and the sectarian divide grew wider and deeper.

Fourthly, the main Northern Ireland political parties started to break up and realign into new groupings. The hard-line Unionists were opposed to any concessions and their nationalist counterparts were not prepared to accept anything less than the reunification of Ireland. Each of these sectarian groups had their own paramilitary organizations which also began to fragment. The more radical members of the IRA broke away to form the Provisional IRA and a small group of Marxist fanatics established the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). On the Unionist side, The Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Freedom Fighters were the main paramilitary movements but, in the mid-1970s there were another dozen such groups with access to weapons. (O'Leary and McGarry, 2000, pp.26-27)

By the mid-1970s, the political centre ground was held by an Alliance Party with Protestant and Catholic members and the Social and Democratic Labour Party which was nationalist and mainly Catholic. Sinn Fein, the second largest nationalist party, hovered on the fringes of legality. Although it denied having any links with the Provisional IRA, it was generally considered to be its political front.

Fifthly, the British Government acted both to contain terrorism and to explore ways of brokering a political compromise. In 1971, it started to intern suspected terrorists without trial. In 1972, it suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament and introduced a policy of direct rule from London. At the same time, more troops were sent in to strengthen the internal security role of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

The British Government's objective was to reach a peaceful settlement without conceding majority rule, a further partition of

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Ulster or a reunification with Ireland. To this end, it encouraged various power-sharing initiatives and carried through a fundamental reorganization of the major welfare, housing and employment services in order to stamp out all forms of sectarian discrimination. These conciliatory policies suffered a dramatic setback when, in 1981, the imprisoned republican terrorists began a hunger strike in order to force the British authorities to grant them political status. Ten of the hunger strikers starved themselves to death. Their deaths wee followed by another wave of killings and maimings.

Throughout the succeeding years of violence, the British and Irish Governments worked together in their search for a constitutional solution. In 1984, they sponsored the appointment of a cross-national New Ireland Forum which published a report setting out various options for confederation or reunification. Once again, the peace process was thwarted by terrorism when the IRA set off a bomb in a Brighton hotel where many Conservatives, including the Prime Minister, were staying in preparation for their Party Conference. Five people were killed and others were badly injured.

For the next ten years, Northern Ireland remained locked in a violent civil war. Sectarian terrorist factions fought each other, the army and the police. The death toll mounted as the violence escalated. In response to incendiarist attacks by vigilante mobs as may as 60,000 Protestants and Catholics were forced to leave their homes and move to places of greater safety.

Throughout these years of community violence, the British and Irish Governments went on looking for constitutional ways to end the conflict. In 1985 they signed an Anglo-Irish Agreement which affirmed that any future change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of its people. The two Governments agreed to set up a new system of devolved administration in Northern Ireland, based on popular consent, power-sharing and equality of civil, political and social rights. In Northern Ireland, the Agreement was denounced by the Unionists and

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Sinn Fein nationalists, (O'Leary and McGarry, 1997, pp.235-239) Shortly afterwards, Mrs Thatcher rejected the Forum's proposals.

In 1992, John Major became Prime Minister and, after reviewing the situation, concluded that the paramilitary terrorists could be contained but not defeated. Secret talks were started with Sinn Fein and in 1994 the main paramilitary organizations on both sides both agreed to a cease-fire. The British and Irish Prime Ministers published a 'Frameworks' proposal setting out an agenda for future discussions. The 1995, they invited an American Senator, George Mitchell, to chair an international committee on arms decommissioning. This move was endorsed by President Clinton. Shortly after Senator Mitchell published his report in 1996, a major business centre in central London was devastated by an IRA bomb outrage. Sinn Fein insisted that the IRA was a separate organization over which it had no control. Throughout Northern Ireland, provocative sectarian marches and counter-marches continued. There were sharp disagreements as to whether or not arms decommissioning should be made a precondition for a peace agreement.

Nevertheless, progress towards a settlement continued. In 1997, the Labour Party won the General Election and opened negotiations with all but two of the Unionist parties. On 10 April 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was brokered. The terms of the Agreement were drafted in such a way that Sinn Fein could see it as a 'transitory' stage in the progress towards Irish reunification and the Unionists could see it as a guarantee that their position was secure so long as it was endorsed by a majority of the Northern Irish people. (Fraser, 2000, p.79)

The Good Friday Agreement proposed an elected Assembly with nationalist and Unionist representation. Its elected members were required to pledge themselves to democratic and non-violent procedures. Other cross-border councils were established in Belfast, Dublin and London, with delegated representatives from the devolved Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly.

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The Agreement did not require a start to arms decommissioning as a precondition for peace but it did lay down a time scale for its implementation. Referenda in Ireland and Northern Ireland gave overwhelming support to the Agreement proposals. A few weeks later, a breakaway terrorist faction of the Real IRA exploded a bomb in a Northern Ireland town which killed twenty-nine adults and children and two unborn babies. The scale of public outrage throughout Ireland and the United Kingdom in response to this atrocity was such that even this extremist group suspended its activities. The perpetrators have never been brought to justice.

The Agreement has survived despite the lack of progress towards arms decommissioning. The peace process may yet fall apart although the great majority of the Northern Irish people still support the Agreement. It remains to be seen whether or not their political leaders can restrain their paramilitary counterparts and finally end a civil war that has killed over 3,000 people and maimed another 42,000 over a period of thirty years.

Conclusion

I end this lecture with a reappraisal of the relevance of Titmuss's and Marshall's writings on the impact of war on the growth of citizenship and welfare. Titmuss, as we have noted, wrote exclusively about conventional wars between nation states. Although I have focused exclusively on the case of Ireland, I think it can be argued, in more general terms, that civil wars do not generate the kinds of social altruism that Titmuss associated with the United Kingdom during the Second World War.

Civil wars are not fought over the conventional issues of social welfare. Ordinary people are not prepared to kill or be killed in the cause of better social services. They are only prepared to do so once they are convinced that they will never become citizens on their own terms until they have won their national independence and the exclusive possession of whatever territories they associate with their

ideal of nationhood. Since the land in question will always be the prime subject of dispute, neither side will ever enjoy the full benefits of freedom, welfare and peace until they are prepared to settle for some kind of territorial compromise.

Conventional theories of welfare fail to take these kinds of issue into account because they are based on conventional definitions of welfare that typically include essential goods and services like health care, social security, education and housing. The land on which these amenities stand is, more or less, taken for granted. When matters of national sovereignty are involved, however, land becomes a unique welfare good. It represents the beginning and end of all our welfare aspirations.

When seemingly irreconcilable conflicts arise over its possession and ownership, land is swiftly transformed into a political symbol of competing claims to national sovereignty and all the other rights that make up the status of citizenship.

Marshall's theory of citizenship outlines an historical process in which civil, political and social rights evolved in a gradual and segmented way. He never claimed, however, that the sequence he described was invariable. Neither did he rule out the possibility that, under certain circumstances, it might be reversed.

In the case of England, Marshall begins his analysis in feudal times when the three elements of citizenship "were wound into a single thread. The rights", he suggests, "were blended because the institutions were amalgamated" and there were no "strict lines of demarcation between the various functions of the State." (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992, p.8) Under these circumstances, there was no uniform collection of rights and duties based on a common status of citizenship. The only rights that ordinary people enjoyed were based on highly localized status relationships between those who held power and property and those who did not.

Marshall goes on to argue that it was the growth of national institutions in government and law which broke up this unity and set each element of citizenship on "its separate way, travelling at its own speed under the direction of its own peculiar principles." (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992, p.9) Under conditions of civil peace and a shared sense of national identity, these divergent processes of change eventually come together again under the unifying status of equal citizenship.

When claims for national independence are denied and their denial leads to civil war, the focus of conflict shifts from the rights of citizenship to the rights of territorial possession. Competing claims to land, based on the association of historical rights of return are especially difficult to resolve, and notably so when the land in question is also charged with religious significance. Whether or not religious conflicts are involved, the onset of civil war invariably reverses the processes by which the civil, political and social rights of citizenship gradually evolve with the passage of time under conditions of peace. As civil wars gather momentum they set in train complex counterprocesses of decivilization, disenfranchisement and desocialization. As the three elements of citizenship break apart under the impact of violence, repression and counterviolence, they follow divergent and regressive paths until, once again, they are all subsumed into a singular and over-riding preoccupation with the possession of land. As the conflict intensifies, land in turn becomes invested with imperative connotations of sovereignty.

In the case of Ireland, the concession of individual rights to land failed to satisfy collective aspirations to limited self-government. By the time that Home Rule was conceded, the impact of protracted civil war had transformed the conflict into a demand for complete independence. Marshall believed that, under conditions of civil peace, the rights of citizenship could compensate for inequalities of wealth and income - provided that these inequalities were not too extreme. No such compensatory mechanism operates under conditions of civil war over sovereignty. The right to self-governance is the most

fundamental of all our political rights and it seems that ordinary people will forego all of their other rights in order to achieve it or defend it.

A nation state, faced with the threat of internal insurgency and secession, cannot be expected to concede part of its territory on terms which imperil its own future survival as a nation. At the same time, it cannot realistically expect to enjoy the full benefits of sovereignty as long as it has to live under conditions of continuous civil war. The same dilemma confronts those who seek a sovereign independence of their own at the other's territorial expense.

Eventually - as the Irish experience demonstrates - the protagonists must choose between the options of permanent conflict and conciliation. Peace is the precondition of welfare but when all the rights of citizenship become contingent on the possession of disputed land, some kind of territorial compromise becomes the precondition for the recovery and growth of citizenship.

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